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Abstract— Nowadays market demand forces companies to 
adapt to mobile technology. For an enterprise company, this 
change will bring up security challenges. In this article, we 
investigate authentication and authorization aspects of 
security. We conduct a case study in Volvo IT in order to 
extract their requirements regarding to authentication and 
authorization of their current and future mobile applications. 
Also we investigate three security protocols: OAuth, OpenID 
and SAML to find out to what extent they can satisfy the 
challenges and requirements.  
Keywords-component; Authentication; Authorization; 
Mobility; Mobile Devices; OAuth; OpenID; SAML. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Mobile technologies are enabling new form of customers 
and business applications (Teng & Helps, 2010). Mobile 
businesses on the other hand are boosting enterprise by 
providing the easy access to the services for third party 
business partners, consultants and customers (Fitzgerald, 
2009). Enterprises are adopting mobile technology and 
providing to market various applications to increase their 
functioning competence by offering customers and 
employees greater access to the real-time information 
(Unhelkar & Murugesan, 2010). 
 
With advancement of mobile technology, new form of 
customers and applications emerged which produces new 
challenges for companies. The challenges mainly caused by 
integrating to mobile services; in order to get adapted to 
mobile advancement, companies should expand the 
boundary of their internal services through Internet. This 
change will enable mobile devices to get access to services, 
which are usually available inside the company through 
native mobile applications. 
 
One of the main concerns with mobile technology and 
mobile devices is how enterprise companies should deal with 
the challenges of security. User experience in mobile devices 
could be completely different than what enterprise used to 
deal internally. Also enterprise companies are constantly 
dealing with the trade-off between making their application 
easier to use and making them more secure. 
 
Volvo is one of the companies that are in the process of 
coping with the mentioned challenges. They are looking on 
different security aspect like authorization and authentication 
of mobile users to their backend systems. Thus they want to 
investigate different protocols in industry that handle these 
challenges. In this article we are going to research three 
protocols, which can be implemented for mobile security in 
enterprise environments. OAuth is an authorization protocol, 
which is in its nature considering mobile client and 
application as well as web application and platforms. Also 
OpenID is a web based authentication protocol that enables 
users to get authenticated through third party identity 
providers as well as in-house identity providers. SAML is 
another protocol, which deals with the transforming 
authentication and authorization information between 
security domains. We are mainly trying to answer the 
question of: How OAuth, OpenID, and SAML can help 
mobile devices in getting secure access to resources and 
services from Volvo backend servers? 
 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: in 
section II, we are going to describe what are OAuth, 
OpenID, and SAML? How do they work? Section III is 
mainly about the research method we used to address the 
problems of our case study and which steps we took to 
gather our data. Section IV is the place that we present our 
analyzed data that we collected during the research period. In 
section V we map Volvo requirements with the capabilities 
of OAuth, OpenID and SAML and try to figure out in what 
extent these protocols can satisfy the requirements of Volvo. 
Finally, we are going to conclude and discuss about possible 
future works at section VI. 
 
In this article we are going to address only OAuth 2.0, 
OpenID 2.0 and SAML 2.0. 
II. KNOWLEDGE BASE 
Information considered as an asset for individuals and 
organizations; so, they try to protect their information assets 
from any posing threat (Todorov, 2007). Security methods 
help to protect the information. Authentication and 
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authorization are aspects of security and we mainly focus on 
them in this article. 
A. Authentication 
Authentication is the process of proving who really you 
are. It often happens at first step of interaction between user 
and operating system or any services. Todorov (2007) 
mentioned that authentication usually refers to determining 
and validating user’s identity. This process should occur 
based on one or combination of the three sorts of credentials: 
something you have, something you are, something you 
know (Windley, 2005). For example, ID and password 
combination is something that only an individual knows or 
certificate is something that an individual have. The most 
common authentication function is ID and password. 
Windley (2005) defined strong authentication is an 
authentication method that required two or more credentials 
like ID/password combination plus certificate. 
B. Authorization 
“Authorization is the process of determining whether an 
already identified and authenticated user is allowed to access 
information resources in a specific way.” (Todorov, 2007) 
 
By authorization systems determine the level of access 
and right of a user to certain resources or services. 
Authorization comes after authentication as a result 
authentication is fundamental for authorization; the reason 
behind that is user should be proved who is she then system 
should assign her right and control access. This chain of 
event always happens sequentially unless user’s identity is 
not important like public services (Windley, 2005). 
 
User can be authenticated by a specific identity; also she 
can apply for authorization under another identity. Such a 
request for authorization under another identity to access a 
service typically refers as Authentication Identity; and if this 
process happens by an application or service acting on behalf 
of the user, it called Impersonation. Impersonation can be 
permanent or temporary. Impersonation is suitable for 
client/server in the way that servers or applications can 
access resources on behalf of users. Impersonation also allow 
limited access to another user’s services or resources when a 
user, application, or service acting on behalf of another user 
(Todorov, 2007). Also, Boyd (2012) defined delegated 
authorization as transferring access to another user, 
application, or service, so that acting user, application, or 
service can perform tasks on behalf of the user. 
ACCESS CONTROL 
“It is important to understand that access control is not a 
complete solution for securing a system”  
(Sandhu & Samarati, 1994) 
 
It is a process that gives a user, application, or service 
defined access right while denying others access (Windley, 
2005). In other words, access control limits what a user is 
able to do, as well as service or application executing on 
behalf of her; so, it would prevent any execution, which end 
up with security breach in some degree (Sandhu & Samarati, 
1994). 
C. OAuth 
This section we define common terms and actors in 
OAuth authorization protocol as well as brief description of 
important OAuth flows of work. 
 
1) What is OAuth 
OAuth is an open protocol to allow secure API 
authorization in a simple and standard method from desktop, 
web and mobile applications. OAuth allows a user to grant 
access to an application to perform on behalf of user; this 
application can only perform the authorized tasks. 
a) Access Token 
Access token is a credential that used to access services 
or resources; it is a string representation of access allowance 
to the resources, which is generated by the grant of resource 
owner from the authorization server (Recordon et al., 2012). 
b) OAuth Roles 
There are several key actors according to (Boyd, 2012) in 
the OAuth as follows: 
• Resource server: The server, which is hosting user’s 
data, which is protected by OAuth. 
• Resource owner: The owner of data, in other words 
the user of the application. 
• Client: The application which makes API request to 
get protected resources on behalf of the resource 
owner. 
• Authorization server: This server gets permission 
from resource owner and issues access token to 
client for accessing protected resources available on 
the resource server. 
 
It is necessary that to register applications with the 
authorization servers since API requests need to be properly 
identified. The protocol allow this process by the automated 
means but most of API providers request manual registration 
through filling out a form on their developers website. 
 
After the registrations get completed, identification 
provider issues the credentials to the developer. These 
credential are: Client ID and Client Secret, which are needed 
in order to make the authorization requests. This client 
credentials has two main benefits; first in the process of 
making authorization request and exchanging authorization 
code for access token, this credentials acts as the means of 
authenticity of the requests. Second the user experience will 
improve during the authorization process by showing to the 
user the name and logo of the application that trying to 
access to the their resources. 
 
c) Client Types 
According to the OAuth Authorization Framework RFC 
(Recordon et al., 2012), there are three client profiles 
available for OAuth. 
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SERVER SIDE WEB APPLICATION 
In this profile the OAuth client is on the web server and 
that web server is making the API calls with the permission 
of the resource owner with help of a server side 
programming language. In this profile the user does not have 
access to the client credentials or the access token. 
CLIENT SIDE APPLICATION ON THE WEB BROWSER 
An OAuth client, in this case, is running on the web 
browser, it could be a JavaScript included in web page, a 
browser extension or a plugin to the web browser (like an 
adobe flash application). Protocol data and credentials are 
easily accessible and often visible to the resource owner. 
NATIVE APPLICATIONS 
It is an OAuth client that is running on a mobile device 
and recourse owner is using that client to access her 
resources. Client credentials included in the application, can 
be extracted, however issued credentials such as access token 
or refresh token can be protected. Depending on the platform 
the credential can be protected from different application 
installed on the device. This profile is the main profile that 
we are going to cover in this article. 
 
d) Authorization Flows 
Boyd (2012) stated that the core OAuth protocol defines 
four primary “grant types” used for obtaining authorization, 
also it defines extra mechanisms for additional grant access. 
But in this article we are going to cover the two main flows, 
which is related to the mobile applications. 
AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW 
This flow is more appropriate for the server-side web 
applications or the mobile applications that have the 
application servers, after the resource owner granted access 
to her data, authentication code is redirected back to the web 
application or the application server as the query parameter 
in the URL (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Authorization code flow (Adapted form (Boyd, 2012)
As in figure 1 illustrated, we present the process step by 
step: 
• Step A: Client, which is the application server in this 
case, sends through the user-agent (Browser/mobile 
application) client identifier and redirect URL to the 
authorization server. 
• Step B: Authorization server asks for the 
authentication process and user enters her password. 
• Step C: After user get authenticated, authorization 
server sends back the authorization code to the user 
agent, then user agent forwards the authorization 
code to the client (application server). 
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• Step D: Client (application server) sends the 
authorization code to the authorization server. 
• Step E: Authorization server generates the access 
token and sends it back to the client. 
FLOW PROPERTIES 
This flow is more suitable when long lived access tokens 
are required; this type of tokens has more accountability 
compared to temporary tokens since credentials would not be 
required from user as long as the token is valid and the token 
is only available to the application server. 
 
IMPILICIT GRANT 
This grant access is optimized for the client side web 
applications running in browser or mobile applications, 
which are not connected to any application servers. The 
resource owner grant access to the application and new 
access token is immediately passed back to the application 
using a hash fragment in the URL (Figure 2). 
 
As in figure 2 illustrated, we describe this flow step by 
step: 
• Step A: Client, which is mobile device in this case, 
sends the client identifier and redirect URL to the 
authorization server. 
• Step B: Authorization server asks for the 
authentication process and user enter her password. 
• Step C: Authorization server generates the access 
token and sends it back to the user agent. 
• Step D: User agent forwards access token to client 
(mobile application) and client should save and 
optionally protect the access token. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Implicit grant flow (Adapted from (Boyd, 2101)) 
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D. OpenID 
OpenID is an open protocol for authentication that let 
users to apply http(s) URL as identity in a specific website 
and extend same URL identity to multiple OpenID enabled 
websites. Also, web integrated applications are enabled to 
operate upon this identity URL for authentication. This 
means that users have control on their credentials without 
exposing it to third party (Rehman, 2008). As in figure 3 
showed, “Eddie.openid.mydomain.com” is the URL identity 
used for OpenID sign in. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  URL based authentication with OpenID 
Rehman (2008) mentioned that OpenID empower users 
to: 
• Login to a website or web enabled application 
without exposing credentials. 
• Let websites to ask users information; and give users 
right to choose which information should be send to 
third party website over authentication process. 
• Determine proper set of information to send to 
website based on need. 
• Provide single sign on (SSO) authentication option 
in multiple applications and websites inside an 
organization. 
• Incorporate websites and web enabled applications 
to OpenID framework in a simple way. 
• Reduce the cost for managing and maintaining 
authentication solutions of an organization for 
consumer. 
• Simplify authentication execution for end-user. 
 
OpenID consists of three major components: Customer, 
Identity Provider, and User Agent (Rehman, 2008). These 
three components communicate and collaborate during 
authentication (Figure 4). 
 
OpenID terminology: 
• End-user: A person who login to variety of website 
by OpenID system. 
• Consumer or relay party: Is the actual website that 
End-user wants to login. 
• Identifier: is a URL that recognizes End-user. 
• Identity Provider or IdP: Is the website that End-user 
have credentials stored there. This host can identify 
user based on matching correct username and 
password. 
• User Agent: is the web browser that End-user uses. 
 
 
Figure 4.  OpenID components (Adapted from (Rehman, 2008)) 
OpenID have two mode of communication: dumb and 
smart. In dumb mode, Consumer does not keep the track of 
state of connection; so, for every login End-user should 
follow the whole step of authentication and basically repeat 
them. On the other hand, in smart mode, Consumer 
maintains the state data and caches shared keys for later 
login. So, smart mode can effectively reduce traffic of the 
servers when End-users what to login many times (Rehman, 
2008). 
 
Dump mode illustrated in figure 5 (Rehman, 2008): 
1. End-user visits Consumer web page and wants to 
login. 
2. The web page requests the Identity Provider URL or 
simply provides a list of identifiers to choose for 
End-user. 
3. Consumer gets information – a web page – from 
Identity Provider. 
4. Consumer parses the information – HTML 
embedded – and detects Identity Provider’s location. 
This step is named discovery. Then, Consumer 
redirects web page to Identity Provider to get 
assertion data by HTTP GET. 
4a. Optionally, Consumer can exchange share key with 
Identity Provider. 
5. End-user logs in to Identity Provider’s web page. 
6. Identity Provider sends back – by HTTP GET – 
assertion data with signature to Consumer through 
browser redirect. It shows authentication success or 
failure. 
7. In case of successful authentication, Consumer 
directly asks Identity Provider for assertion data. 
This data can be checked and validated against User 
Agent data. 
8. If assertion information is valid, End-user can login 
to Consumer website otherwise the Authentication 
fails. 
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Figure 5.  OpenID dumb mode (Adapted from (Rehman, 2008)) 
 
 
 
 
SMART MODE: 
The smart mode is the same process as dump mode 
except step seven. At step seven Consumers can check and 
verify assertion data, based on the shared key on step 4-A. In 
smart mode, step 4A proceeds when Consumer wants to 
update caches or obtain it at the first time (Rehman, 2008). 
 
E. SAML 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an 
XML based protocol for transaction of authentication and 
authorization information across domain boundaries. SAML 
addresses strong trust, high-value transaction, and privacy 
requirements for identity management. It enables users, 
applications, and services to communicate via XML 
messages (Maler & Reed 2008). In the other words, SAML 
provides a standard for transaction of user security 
information over insecure networks like Internet between 
identity provider and service provider domains. It describes 
set of rules and syntaxes for identity information transaction 
while it is flexible and customizable (Lewis & Lewis, 2009). 
As in Figure 6 illustrated, SAML solve the problem of 
accessing services and resources of a domain by another 
domain’s users and systems; so, user A at domain A 
authenticates by authentication server of domain A and uses 
services of domain B. SAML ports the trust that domain A 
have granted to user A to domain B. 
 
 
Figure 6.  SAML overview 
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SAML defines three roles that are involved in SAML 
transactions: asserting party, relying party and subject. 
Asserting party is the identity provider that provides the user 
information. Relying party trusts assertion information from 
the identity provider and provides the services to user. 
Subject is the user with the identity that is going to be 
transacted (Lewis & Lewis, 2009). 
 
SAML have four components: assertions, protocols, 
bindings, and profiles. Each layer of standards is 
customizable in order to implement specific organizational 
use-cases. SAML assertions get exchanged between SAML 
parties (Lewis & Lewis, 2009) - such as transaction between 
user A and service B in figure 6. Todorov (2007) mentioned 
that SAML have three assertions: 
 
• Authentication: shows user’s successful 
authentication to, authentication authority, it also 
may contain timestamp, type of credential, and etc. 
• Authorization: may contain user’s permission or 
access to an object, group membership, or any other 
information regarding to resources’ authorization. 
• Attribute: contain user’s information like email 
address, telephone, and etc. 
 
SAML describes request and response protocols for 
communicating between SAML parties; for example, Single 
Logout Protocol, within SAML, describes the flow of 
request and response in order to logout from all services by 
user. Another example is Authentication Request Protocol, 
which describes how service provider is able to request 
authentication or attribute assertion statement. SAML 
bindings map SAML protocols to other network protocols in 
order to transport assertion between SAML parties; for 
example, HTTP Redirect Binding relies on HTTP redirect 
messages to transport SAML assertions. And the last 
components of SAML are profiles; these components 
determine how assertions, protocols and bindings will 
cooperate to provide single sign on. For example Web 
Browser SSO Profile uses the authentication request protocol 
with any of HTTP redirect, HTTP POST or HTTP Artifact 
bindings. Another example is Single logout Profile that uses 
the Single Logout Protocol; this profile can logout the user 
form all the service providers using one logout function 
(Lewis & Lewis, 2009). 
 
III. RESEARCH APPROACH 
“A case study examines a phenomenon in its natural 
setting, employing multiple methods of data collection to 
gather information from one or few entities (people, groups, 
or organizations).” (Benbasat et al, 1987) 
 
This research is a case study which we investigate 
different authentication and authorization methods in the 
context of mobility and security inside the Volvo IT. We 
gathered our information from Volvo IT employees. The 
context of research is bonded to Volvo; however, we tried to 
generalize and extend the foundings to make them suitable 
for other enterprise companies.   
A. Research Setting 
This study is a bachelor thesis, which is done by 
collaboration of IT university of Gothenburg and Volvo IT 
during ten weeks of research. Volvo IT was interested in 
how they can utilize different authentication and 
authorization protocols for securing their mobile applications 
in future. In this research we focus our investigation on 
finding possible relevant requirements regarding to accessing 
backend services by mobile devices for Volvo IT. 
Additionally, we did not consider financial and other barriers 
regarding to implementation of this technology. 
B. Research Process 
At first step of this research, we focus on the different 
architecture styles to detect any relation between them and 
mobile security. But, after extensive research on Service 
Oriented Architecture, Message Bus Architecture, and Event 
Driven Architecture, it turned out that there is not an obvious 
relation between them at implementation level; since these 
architectural styles are very abstract, any enterprise 
implementation of these are usually mixed to provide more 
functional and nonfunctional requirements. So, at this 
research we tried to bring our arguments and discussions to 
the context of Service oriented architecture, which is the 
current comment architecture style at Volvo.  
 
Then, we studied related literature, which are aligned to 
the area of mobility and security. We started to look for the 
security protocols related to the authentication and 
authorization. For limiting our study to fit in the limited time 
that we had, we chose three protocols (OAuth, OpenID and 
SAML) which Volvo were interested in.  
 
Then, we interviewed mobile application developers and 
system architects of Volvo IT in order to discover general 
requirements of mobile applications and specific 
requirements of access control in their systems. In the next 
step we collected the entire requirement together and 
generated proper requirement list. Finally, we checked 
capability of OAuth, OpenID and SAML against generated 
requirements; and by that we conclude if these protocols can 
add value to Volvo IT or not.   
 
C. Data Collection 
Interviews were the source of data that we gathered at 
Volvo IT. We have conducted four unstructured (Myers & 
Newman, 2007) interviews at Volvo IT. We had an interview 
with the mobile developers of Volvo, which gives us insight 
on major challenges of getting access control over the 
backend services of Volvo. The other interviews were mostly 
focused at discovering various scenarios in which these 
protocols can be suitable for Volvo IT. Since those 
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interviews were unstructured, we try to take note and gather 
related data at interview sessions. 
 
D. Data Analysis 
Our collected data was analyzed using Qualitative Data 
Analysis; we applied a process of collecting interview notes, 
analyzing notes, extracting initial requirements, investigation 
and studying new topics which emerged from previous 
interviews, plan for the next interview and refining our 
requirement list after each interview. After every interview 
the notes were put together in order to sync the outcome on 
each interview, then we tried to find relevant information; 
these information led us to a specific requirement and, 
consequently, to form the initial list of requirements. Also, 
we extracted new topics and areas, which needed to be 
investigated to fill the knowledge gap; furthermore, those 
topics and areas helped us to detect and remove unrelated 
data and requirements. As a result of this process, we keep 
the requirements within the scope of research. Finally, after 
the last interview, we collect all the requirements to form the 
final requirement list. 
 
E. Research Limitations 
Based on the fact that OAuth is a new protocol for 
handling access control there is not enough published 
material and article to investigate. Only few large enterprise 
like Google and facebook already have this technology in 
place for their systems and this technology, at the time being, 
is not adapted really well on the enterprise companies except 
major software developer (OAuth, 2011). 
 
The other limitation for this research was related to the 
fact that Volvo is not adapted to the mobile industry in a 
proper way; because of that they do not have guideline and 
principal documents regarding to mobile developments. As a 
result, we could not include internal documents of Volvo in 
our research. So, we faced a hard time extracting the 
requirements. 
 
Other specification was unclear and the scope was wide 
at first stage of research. At the beginning, we wanted to find 
the suitable combination of software architectures and 
security methods for mobile devices. Given that, we 
investigated software architectures like Service Oriented 
Architecture, Message Bus Architecture, and Event Driven 
Architecture. First, these architectures were wide area to 
investigate. Second, implementations of those architectures 
in enterprises were more or less mixture of them. So, our 
finding indicates that there is not any relation between 
security methods and architectures style in the case of Volvo. 
 
IV. REQUIREMENTS 
In this section we are going to present the requirements 
that we extracted from data analysis. We divided the 
requirements to two categories: security and usability 
requirements. 
A. Security Requirements 
This section concerned with the requirements that 
fulfilling them improves the security of the system. 
 
1) Requirement 1 (Limited access rights) 
One of the security concerns, mentioned by two Volvo 
architects, was that a mobile application should provides a 
method to implement access control to backend services; in 
the other words, authorizing users. Due to authorization 
access level for users, some services should be accessible 
and others should be inaccessible. So, the system should 
provide a list of services to the mobile application based on 
the user’s access rights. 
 
2) Requriement 2 (Shared mobile device between 
employees) 
There are some organization working with Volvo that 
using Volvo mobile applications and services. These 
organizations are using Volvo services on an organization’s 
mobile devices that are shared between their employees. 
These employees might have variety of access right to use 
Volvo services; it is a security concern for Volvo to prevent 
unauthorized user to access resources on behalf of another 
user. 
 
3) Requirment 3 (Authentication without storing 
credentials) 
One of Volvo IT architects mentioned that it is difficult 
for Volvo IT to keep all mobile users’ credentials in Volvo 
IT databases. Currently, Volvo has some mobile applications 
and planning to deploy more applications to public. So, 
Volvo is seeking for a way to authenticate and authorize 
users without registering their credentials. One solution is 
relying on credentials of another company, which is suitable 
for more public backend services. So, system should be able 
to authenticate and authorize users based on credentials of 
either Volvo IT or another company.   
 
4) Requiremet 4 (Authorization of third party 
applications) 
In one of the interviews an architect from Volvo 
mentioned due to the rapid growth in mobile industry, in 
future, Volvo wants to facilitate the potential of using third 
party organizations to develop mobile applications for them. 
Therefore Volvo needs to find a way to grant third party 
developers accessing their backend services in a secure way 
in order to let them utilize Volvo’s resources and services. 
 
5) Requrirement 5 (Single logout) 
Since there is more than one mobile service, user needs 
to login to different services. So, whenever user wants to log 
out, she should log out from all services that she was using. 
There is a possibility that user may forget to logout from all 
services; this poses a security risk. So, system should be able 
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to logout the user from all services when she logout from any 
service. 
 
B. Usability Requirements 
This section concerned with the requirements that 
fulfilling them improves the user experience of the system, 
which are, still related to the authentication, authorization 
and general security issues. 
 
1) Requirement 6 (Long lived access) 
Applications should not ask for credentials each time the 
user opens it. It should have an internal mechanism to save 
the state of connection with the backend servers. This will 
prevent annoying password prompt every time the user 
reopen the application. 
 
2) Requirement 7 (Single sign on) 
For a group of applications using the same identity 
provider, user should receive prompt for credentials only 
once. If a user opens an application and provides her 
credentials to the identity provider, she should not asked 
again for credentials from another application which is using 
the same identity provider for accessing services on backend. 
This concept is known as the single sign on. 
 
3) Requirment 8 (Revoke application access) 
Typically, there are many applications that are 
authenticated and authorized by a single user; such a user 
should be able to cut off any application’s access, to her 
resources whenever she wants. 
V. DISCUSSION 
In this section we are going to describe whether the 
above requirements could be addressed by the presented 
protocols’ capabilities or not. This information can be used 
by Volvo or other enterprise to grasp a better understanding 
on which areas these protocols can be helpful for them; This 
understanding help them to make a decision whether or not 
to utilizing these technologies into their systems. The below 
requirements are in the same order as they presented in 
section IV. 
A. Limited access rights 
Based on the presented information on section II, OAuth 
is a protocol that covers delegated authorization; with this 
protocol you can authorize a mobile client or web application 
to use resources or connect to APIs on behalf of the resource 
owner. However, this protocol is not capable to provide and 
generate the list of services based on rights of the users. 
OpenID is an authentication protocol therefore it cannot act 
as the access control mechanism. Also SAML is a protocol 
for transferring authentication and authorization between 
different domains and it can only transfer the authorization 
decision, which has already been made. This requirement 
can be met by Role-Based Access Control systems (Windley, 
2005) which none of mentioned security methods are 
capable. 
B. Shared mobile device between employees 
This requirement is beyond the scope of these protocols, 
it emphasizes on the security risk of the mobile devices, 
which can be physically shared. Due to nature of the 
problem, physical risk of security, OAuth, OpenID and 
SAML are not the security methods to utilize as the solution. 
However, biometric authentication (Windley, 2005; Tuyls et 
al., 2005) may implement in mobile devices to solve the 
problem; this strong authentication still can be implemented 
allied with OAuth and SAML. 
C. Authentication without storing credentials 
This requirement is related to the situation that Volvo 
wants to have some services available to the public, but they 
also want to have a sort of authentication without going 
through the process of registering users. In this case one 
solution to this problem could trust another identity provider 
to authenticate the users. In order to do that Volvo should 
develop their application with the ability to stand as the 
client concept in OAuth and get the identity credentials like 
id and email from the external identity provider like 
facebook or Google. In other words this kind of applications 
prompt users to give them access to their basic credential 
through other organizational credential databases (Boyd, 
2012).  
 
Another way to address this requirement is through 
OpenID protocol. OpenID enables authentication from an 
identity provider, which is running by another organization. 
Users can enter their OpenID URL, which they obtained, 
from another organization (i.e. facebook or Google) to enter 
the applications that has been created by Volvo (Rehman, 
2008). This enables the user to login with their preferred 
identity provider and give to the Volvo the advantage of not 
storing every user’s credentials. However they should 
consider the reliability of the identity providers that they are 
going to trust. We are not going to cover that which 
organization is suitable for Volvo to trust because this matter 
is out of scope of this research. 
D. Authorization of third party applications 
The first impact of third party developer to the system is 
the potential security breach; when a user inputs her 
credentials to the third party application in order to access 
Volvo backend services, such credentials may store, in an 
unsecure way, to mobile device. To avoid this problem 
OAuth suggest a solution. 
 
OAuth suggest that the third party application, should not 
have resource owner’s credentials unless there is high degree 
of trust between resource owner and client (Like official 
applications). If there is not high degree of trust between 
client and resource owner, client can get an access token to 
access the resources instead of resource owner’s credentials. 
However, without OAuth, client must access to resource 
owner’s credentials in order to access resources and services; 
with the access token in OAuth, there is no need to store 
resource owner’s credentials for later authorization 
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(Recordon et al., 2012). As in figure 7 illustrated, access 
token goes to the resource server instead of credentials.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Simple OAuth flow (Adapted from (LeBlanc, 2011)) 
 
Furthermore, OAuth suggests setting up an application 
server in order to improve the security. As we mentioned in 
OAuth flow section, there are two types of flows - 
Authorization code and implicit grant - that can be 
implemented in this case. The Authorization code has 
significant security improvement compared to implicit grant. 
This improvements lie in the ability to hide the access token 
from user agent, since the token is stored on the application 
server, user agent cannot access it. As a result of that, there is 
no risk of token exposure by user agent. On the other hand, 
implicit grant improve efficiency due to deducted number of 
round trips to get access token. Therefore, usability should 
be overweight the security to justify implicit grant 
implementation otherwise Authorization Code should be 
implemented (Recordon et al., 2012). Because of evolving 
third party developers that are not fully trusted by Volvo, in 
the process of mobile application development, Volvo can 
take benefit of OAuth by implementing Authentication Code 
flow that provide more security. 
E. Single logout 
The only protocol that can meet this requirement is 
SAML. After an application has authenticated to an identity 
provider, a session may be established between that 
application and the identity provider. In this case, identity 
provider may issue assertions to service provider also the 
identity provider can act as the session authority as well. If a 
system or user wants to logout, it can be satisfied with single 
logout profile of SAML. For this protocol <LogoutRequest> 
and <LogoutResponse> messages are defined (Hughes et al., 
2005). In figure 8, sequential requests and responses to 
logout from all service are illustrated.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Single logout sequence diagram 
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F. Long-lived access 
OAuth covers this requirement in two different ways; one 
way is by issuing the access token with long life span, which 
grant access to the resources and services even an unlimited 
access. The other way is through refresh token. There is a 
security problem with the first way and having one-time 
long-lived access tokens, and that is because the OAuth 
typically uses bearer tokens without signature to connect to 
APIs. Also most of the time an OAuth token may provide 
access to multiple APIs, compromise of a token can give the 
attacker access to multiple services and could be an 
extensive security threat for the system. 
 
On the other hand, refresh tokens reduce the security 
vulnerability of the system; in case a token is compromised 
then the token is going to expire and new token is going to 
be replaced by it. This process is accomplished with an 
HTTP POST request and with sending the refresh token 
(Boyd, 2012). 
G. Single sign on 
Both OpenID and SAML provide solutions for SSO. As 
in section II.D mentioned, OpenID have two modes to 
handle SSO. In OpenID, Identity provider is the only service 
that user should sign on; given that, user can access other 
backend services offering by other consumers without 
signing on. 
 
SAML have similar solution to this requirement as 
followed (Hughes et al., 2005): 
1. User send a HTTP request to service provider 
2. Service provider resolve the identity provider  
3. Service provider send a <AuthnRequest> message to 
identity provider 
4. Identity provider identify the user (Authenticate the 
user or use existing session) 
5. Identity provider send the <Response> to service 
provider 
6. Based on the <Response> service provider deny or 
grant the access to user 
 
 
H. Revoke application access 
OAuth has the advantage over the basic authorization 
method based on the fact of having tokens instead of 
password.  
 In the basic authorization, which uses the password for 
accessing the APIs and resources of backend, the problem is 
by giving password, the only way for user to revoke access 
to her resources on the backend is to change the password.  
And if user has multiple applications using one service 
endpoint, then after changing password, to revoke one of the 
application’s accesses to her resources then she should 
provide new password for all the other applications that she 
wants to still have access to her resources. This is obviously 
spoiling the user experience; they want to have an easy way 
to cut the access of an application to a resources or services. 
 
In OAuth, because the access is made through tokens and 
not passwords, when a user wants to revoke an application’s 
access, the only thing that system need to do is to discard 
that specific token which grants access to that application 
(Boyd, 2012). 
I. Discussion Summary 
The overall picture of what these protocols can satisfy in 
term of requirements of section IV is presented in Table 1. 
The first two requirements (limited access right and shared 
mobile device between employees) are the ones that none of 
the protocols can handle. But for the rest of requirements we 
have at least one protocol to satisfy them. Therefore in order 
to satisfy the maximum functionality, a combination of these 
protocols could be the solution. There are some projects that 
are combining OAuth to OpenID or SAML; for example 
OpenID Connect is a combination of OpenID authentication 
method with OAuth capabilities (AB/Connect Work Group, 
2012). At another project, Developerforce is combining 
SAML and OAuth (Developerforce, 2012). Since those 
projects are in the initial stage of development and because 
of the low reliability we are not going to investigate them. 
But they could be considered for the future solutions. 
 
 
OAuth is not a full security solution for enterprise but it 
can handle delegate authorization in a secure way. It is 
suitable for enterprise companies that have numerous mobile 
applications or mobile users. That’s why; OAuth is mainly 
used by social websites like Google and Facebook. There is 
still a gap between implementation and standardization - at 
the time of composing this paper; OAuth 2.0 still is a RFC 
draft (Recordon et al., 2012). Yet, some companies are using 
the implementation based on the draft version currently 
(OAuth, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, OpenID is web friendly protocol that 
provides a solution for SSO; OpenID can be implemented 
and integrated to mobile web enabled applications. SAML 
also have solution for SSO. However, SAML is more 
enterprise friendly, provides more security, and is more 
compatible with other security methods, on the other hand 
OpenID bring more simplicity and scalability (Maler & 
Reed, 2008). So, these two protocols can be implemented 
and utilized for securing mobile devices according to the 
specific use case. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
Providing backend service to new mobile user is bring up 
some issues to enterprises; most important issue is how to 
secure these services to mobile devices over the insecure 
network like internet. This problems and issues are mainly 
related to authentication and authorization aspects of 
security. How can a user get authenticated outside the trusted 
domain and how services and resources should be accessible 
 
14 
by user and in what level? These are the questions that 
should be taken into consideration in order to securing 
mobile devices integration to enterprise backend services.  
 
To answer the research question, we investigated three 
protocols that bring security to the process of integrating 
mobile devices, to enterprise backend services. OAuth, 
SAML, and OpenID are protocols that have defined set of 
rules for authentication and authorization. We performed a 
case study at Volvo in order to find out to what extent these 
protocols can satisfy the requirements of Volvo regarding to 
providing their services for mobile devices. We found eight 
requirements, which are categorized into user experience and 
security.  
 
None of the security methods can meet all of the 
requirements. However, there are possibilities of combining 
these security methods together to meet more requirements. 
These combinations need more research and study as a future 
research. For requirement one, Role Based Access Control 
system is the solution for limited access control (Windley, 
2005). To meet this requirement with others, we suggest to 
investigation of what protocol can support Role Based 
Access Control and if they can be combined with SAML, 
OAuth, and OpenID. Another area to research is requirement 
2, how mobile devices that are shared between employees of 
an organization can be authenticated and authorized. One 
area for future investigation could be biometric 
authentication for meeting this requirement (Windley, 2005; 
Tuyls et al., 2005). Finally for finding suitable solution for 
Volvo we suggest to perform another investigation on 
financial and implementation barriers that we have not 
considered in this article. 
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